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| Physician Law Review |
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| Refusal of care |
| 2. |
Refusal of
Care. |
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A. Overview
State courts have
increasingly allowed competent adult patients to
refuse treatment. With the Supreme Court's
decision in Cruzan (110 S. CT. 2841, 111 L.ED. 2d
224 1990), and the increased use of advance
directives, the courts are allowing individuals to
decline medical intervention. However this is not
an unlimited right to refuse life saving care. In
certain situations courts will determine that the
right to refuse care is not absolute and will
consider countervailing interests. Decision making
in this arena is complex, and emergency physicians
should seek advice from hospital counsel and
administration.
B. The Competent Adult
May Refuse Treatment.
State courts have
upheld a non-terminally ill but competent person's
right to refuse life-saving medical treatment, (In
the matter of Lawrence, 579 NE 2d 32 (Ind. 1991)).
In this case artificial hydration and nutrition
were deemed "treatment" that a competent patient
can accept or reject. In Werth v. Taylor, 475 NW
2d 426 (Mich. App. 1991), the court held that a
competent adult patient has the right to decline
any and all forms of medical intervention,
including life-saving or life prolonging
treatment.
In McKenzie v. Doctors Hospital
of Hollywood, Inc., (No. 90-6961-Civ U.S. Dist. CT
S.D. Fl., June 24, 1991), the court held that
under Florida law a competent adult has a right to
refuse a blood transfusion. In the case In Re
Marrazzo, No. 90-14709, New York Supreme Court,
Suffolk County, Jan. 2, 1991, a patient with
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, who was only able
to communicate by jerking her lower jaw, was found
by the court to be a competent adult with the
right to determine the course of her medical
treatment. In McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P. 2d 617
(New. 1990), the court held that a competent,
non-terminal, adult quadriplegic would be
permitted to discontinue a life sustaining
ventilator.
C. The Adult's Right to
Refuse Treatment is Not
Unlimited
However courts have also held
that adults do not have an unlimited right to
refuse life-saving medical treatment. For example,
in Norwood Hospital v. Munoz, 564 N.E. 2d 1017
(Mass. 1991), the court stated that the right to
refuse medical treatment in life threatening
situations is not absolute. Countervailing
interests include preservation of life, prevention
of suicide, maintenance of the ethical integrity
of the medical profession and protection of
innocent third parties.
D. Refusal of
Treatment Must be Contemporaneous and
Informed.
Courts have held that any
refusal of life-saving medical treatment must be
contemporaneous and informed to be enforced. For
example, in Werth v. Taylor, 475 N.W. 2d 426
(Mich. App. 1991) the court held that a patient's
prior refusals to permit blood transfusions, which
were made before necessity for transfusion arose
and in contemplation of routine dilation of the
cervix and curettage of the uterine lining, were
not contemporaneous and informed. Thus, the
physicians giving the patient a blood transfusion
when she was under anesthesia determined that
transfusion was necessary to save the patient's
life. This did not constitute "assault and
battery" regardless of whether the physician
failed to obtain her husband's permission.
E. The Adult Jehovah's
Witness
1. Jehovah's Witnesses firmly
believe that transfusion of blood will result in a
loss of eternal life, based on interpretation of
biblical passages.
2. Witnesses do not
accept transfusion of whole blood, packed cells,
white cells, or plasma, or autotransfusion of
pre-deposited blood. However, many will permit use
of albumin, immunoglobulins, hemophiliac
preparations, crystalloids, hetastarch, or
intravenous iron dextran, as well as dialysis, use
of heart lung equipment, and intraoperative
salvage if extracorporeal circulation is
uninterrupted . If the use of fluorinated blood
substitute becomes available, this practice would
not be objectionable to witnesses. In addition,
organ transplant is not specifically
prohibited.
3. Transfusion can be
authorized over the patient's objections if
there's a question of the patient's competency, or
if the state demonstrates a compelling, overriding
interest, or if the refusal is not contemporaneous
and informed. Therefore, transfusions may be
authorized in Jehovah's Witnesses who are not
competent adults, have dependents, or are
pregnant, or in those for whom there is reasonable
doubt of the strength of their religious
convictions. These patients or their families
should be advised in advance of the pending
transfusion.
4. Jehovah's Witnesses will
sign standard AMA forms that legally relieve
physicians and hospitals from liability associated
with their care, and most carry a medic alert
card. Both documents are binding on the patient
and protect the physician.
F. Children
and Refusal of Care
Unless a minor is
emancipated, a "mature minor", or has one of the
special conditions covered by the treatment
statutes, he or she is not cognitively or legally
capable of giving or refusing consent for medical
treatment. The 8 year old refusing a laceration
repair is typically not a problem. Both the
parents and physician agree on treatment, and the
child is overruled.
Problems typically
arise when the adolescent refuses care. This often
presents a significant dilemma for the emergency
physician. For example, a mother presents to the
ED with her 16 year old daughter. Mother states
that she believes the child has had sexual
intercourse, and mom asks the physician to perform
a pelvic exam. The 16 year old adamantly refuses
examination.
The case clearly presents an
ethical and legal dilemma. Arguably, the refusal
of care should be respected. The 16 year old is
probably old enough to understand her actions. She
certainly understands the nature and purpose of
the examination. State law supports the minor when
presenting for STDs and pregnancy. States are
increasingly recognizing the minors right to
privacy. The emergency physician should evaluate
and document the patient's developmental state and
maturity. The child's refusal should be accepted
under either the mature minor exception or may be
covered under one of the specific treatment
statutes with regard to pregnancy or STDs.
In those jurisdictions that recognize the
mature minor, the minor has the same right as a
competent adult to refuse life sustaining
treatment. In the case of In Re E.G., 549 N.E. 2d
322 (IL 1989) a seventeen year old leukemic
Jehovah witness was permitted to refuse
life-saving transfusion. However, not all
jurisdictions recognize the mature minor doctrine.
For example, in the case of In Re Long Island
Jewish Medical Center, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 239 (1990)
the court refused to adopt the mature minor
doctrine and recommended that the legislature or
appellate courts adopt a doctrine with an
appropriate procedural safeguard.
Minor
'refusal of care' cases can be complex and there
are many grey areas. For example, a fifteen year
old male with leukemia refuses a blood
transfusion; or a seventeen year old female with
vaginal bleeding and lower abdominal pain decides
to leave AMA prior to evaluation for ectopic
pregnancy. These are difficult issues, and you
should not attempt to go it alone. Request
assistance from hospital administration or
hospital counsel.
G. Parent refuses
medical care for the child.
Generally,
state and federal courts support parental control
over the basic matters affecting their children.
However, when parental actions have resulted in
inadequate medical care, courts in the United
States have stepped in to decide between parent
wishes and physician concerns. Under the doctrine
of "parens patriae" (the state's paternalistic
interest in children) the state will not allow a
child's health to be seriously jeopardized because
of the parent's limitations or convictions. A
parent does not have the authority to forbid
saving their child's life. Courts invariably rule
in favor of a physician who claims that a parent
is denying standard medical care to a child.
Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the
state represents the best interests of the child.
The state also looks to the child abuse and
neglect statutes, which provide for protective
custody when the child has not received medically
indicated treatment.
Once again, the
emergency physician is empowered by understanding
the law. If parents withhold consent, and there is
a life threat, the emergency physician should take
temporary protective custody based on child
neglect. It helps to explain to the parents that
this is a medical obligation under the law, and
you will immediately report to the hospital
administrator, hospital attorney and the local
child protection agency. The parents will
typically stand down and allow you to proceed with
your mission. Even in situations where the minor's
life may not be threatened but severely impaired,
the courts usually will order medical treatment
over the parents objections.
If there is
no life threat, and no potential for serious
impairment, the parents refusal should be
respected. The refusal should be "informed" and
well documented. In this context, "informed" means
that one or both parents have a normal mental
status, understand the risks of refusal, have had
an opportunity to ask questions and have decided
to leave against your advice.
Remember that
you are protected from civil and criminal
liability under the child abuse and neglect
statutes. You may be hesitant to take custody, but
it should not be for fear of
liability.
H. Parental refusal based on
claims of religious freedom.
The first
amendment issue of religious freedom does not
change the analysis. The typical example is the 14
year old male, victim of a car accident with a
lacerated spleen. He is shocky and needs blood.
The emergency physician has typed and crossed, and
contacted the surgeon to go to the OR. The parents
intercede and refuse to consent to the blood
administration.
The courts have held that
denying medical care to a child is not within the
parents' First Amendment right of freedom of
religion: "The right to practice religion freely
does not include the liberty to expose... a
child... to ill health or death. Parents may be
free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not
follow that they are free ... to make martyrs of
their children..." State v. Perricone, N.J.Rep.,
Vol. 37, p. 463, Atlantic Reporter, 2d Series, Vol
181, p. 751, 1962.
In Re: The Petition of
Allen Town Hospital- Lehigh Valley Hospital Center
in the matter of J.S.S., (No. 1990-1492, Common
Court of Pleas of Lehigh County Pennsylvania,
Orphans Court Division, December 13, 1990) a
Pennsylvania Court ordered a pregnant mother, who
was a member of the Jehovah Witness faith, to
undergo a blood transfusion to save the life of
her unborn child. The Pennsylvania Court of Common
Pleas issued a court order in which it held (1)
that the mother had the legal right to refuse
consent to administration of blood products, even
if it was likely if she would die without such
treatment; but (2) did not have the right to
refuse consent to transfusions or administration
of blood products, if the unborn child were likely
to die, to be stillborn, or suffer irreversible
physical injury as a result.
In the case
of In matter of McCauley, 565 N.E. 2d 411 (Mass.
1991) the court applied the best interest test and
determined the child should receive treatment when
the child's parents refused to consent to medical
treatment on religious grounds.
The
emergency physician should take temporary
protective custody, provide care in such cases,
and report to the appropriate individuals and
agencies.
In more difficult cases, such as
the management of the terminally ill, there are
many ethical and legal uncertainties. In the
previous car accident case, clearly blood
administration is in the "best interest" of the
child. But in other cases, such as a minor with
leukemia and a life threatening anemia, the "best
interest" analysis is far more difficult. Here the
emergency physician must discuss the case with the
family physician and may need to temporize until
reasoned judgment from a larger group of decision
makers can be brought to bear.
1.
Review of pediatric refusal of care
issues:
a. In emergency situations, defined as
conditions requiring prompt treatment, and not
limited to potentially fatal or disabling
conditions, any child may be treated without
parental consent.
b. Failure to provide
treatment in these circumstances may constitute
negligence.
c. If treatment may entail
risk, it is prudent to obtain a second opinion
regarding the need for prompt treatment. Second
opinions and attempts to contact the parents
should be documented in the chart.
d.
"Emancipated" or minors living on their own who
are self-supporting and not subject to parental
control, a definition that includes college
students and unmarried minor mothers, may provide
their own consent for treatment.
e.
Statutes enacted by many states allow minors to
give permission for treatment of venereal disease,
or drug or alcohol problems without parental
consent, and prohibit informing the parent
regarding such treatment (including sending a
bill) without the consent of the minor.
f.
The "mature minor" rule based on multiple court
decisions, indicates that young people who are
capable of providing appropriate informed consent
may give valid consent for treatment which does
not involve serious risks. Although minors have a
corresponding right to refuse treatment, it
appears to be doubtful the courts will uphold the
rights of a minor to refuse treatment that may be
life saving.
g. It is noted that, in the
past 30 years, no cases have been reported in
which a parent has successfully sued a physician
for the non-negligent care of an adolescent
provided without parental
consent.
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